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ABSTRACT
Jurgen Habem1as·s theory of an eroded public sphere is common to media studies
that address the functions and shortfalls of news media in society. The theory
tackles many aspects of society. but is most usually associated with the mass media
and its role in facilitating infom1ed public debate among private persons coming
together as a public to hold institutions of power to account. The term has been
used to such a degree that its authority is taken as rote. which has subsequently
reduced the complexity. subtleties and strength of Jurgen Habem1as·s original
argwnents. In tum. this has caused critics to question the most fundamental aspects
of the theory: is there just one sphere?: are the public merely acquiescent dupes of
the mass media?; do the media really deliberately coerce and manipulate
unsuspecting audiences? Habermas · s theory of an eroded public sphere is
contentious and a target for criticism because in its simplistic form it appears
conspiratorial and unlikely within a society with a free press and democratic
institutions. Hmvever. this thesis argues that while there are certainly deliberate
attempts at distorting public communications by influential actors. it is the
prevailing conditions of communication that allow for such distortion. In this
respect. Habermas·s theory deals with the structures and communicative networks
within society and how these contribute to a depleted public sphere.
In essence. the public sphere has been appropriated by autonomous organisations
external to the public sphere. or the arena of common civil experience. These
organisations seek legitimation by means of public acclamation attracted by
manufactured publicity. However, public opinions that emerge from the public
sphere and those that are formed from within private organisations, such as
political parties and profit making corporations, are quite different. While there no
doubt exists a spectrum of possible communicative interactions between private
opinions and those that emerge from the public sphere, private organisations tend
to treat the public as spectators and consumers. Like corporations who use tested
marketing techniques such as opinion polling and surveys to distinguish markets,
political parties and government use the same methods to sell policy or reputations
in order to legitimate their power and influence over a voting public. The result is a

.

public sphere that is targeted by of various corporate or political opinions and
agendas competing for public acclamation. The disparate information being
channelled through the public sphere tends to cause mistrust between a public and
2

its political leaders. This is primarily because of a lack of consistency in the quality
and veracity of information stemming from the fact that information does not often
reflect or correlate with the lived experiences common to an electorate. By using
news media accounts of the Australian 2004 federal election campaign. this study
intends to demonstrate that Habermas's theory of an eroded public sphere is an
effective way of casting a critical eye over nevvs media organisations and their
interaction \Vith political po\ver and influence.
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Introduction
This study considers the news media's role in Australian society using Habermas's
account of an eroded public sphere. The arguments that this thesis will be
concerned \vith centre around Habermas's description, as outlined in The Structural

Tramfiwmation <~( the Public Sphere (1989). of how increased journal and
nev,spaper circulation, along with growing press freedoms from the early
seventeenth century, allovved for public critical political debate. Newspapers
informed a concerned readership of the relations between merchants. citizens,
government representatives and all who felt they had a stake in the proceedings.
That is, anyone \Vho wanted the chance to participate in civil society. Ideally. those
who contributed to such public meetings in the coffee houses and salons of
continental Europe and Britain during the eighteenth century were considered
equals regardless of position or title and, therefore, had the means by which to hold
government accountable. The emphasis that Habermas places on this arrangement
is the equality of the pai1icipants and the condition that the strongest argument
during ·rational-critical debate of a public into public opinion· (Habermas, 1989, p.
219) would win. It was this guarantee of universal access, claims Habermas, w'hich
would ensure current truths were bound to the logic of argument and counterargument (p. 219). As with most guarantees, however, it comes with a caveat,
which is often confused with an oversight on Habermas·s part. That is, while free
association and access to various arenas of public debate may be available to a
public, privately organised bodies of influence and po\ver can potentially subvert
opinions emerging from such arenas. Since the rise of advanced capitalism during
the mid to late nineteenth century, Habermas claims that the public sphere has
splintered into self-representing, hierarchical organisations with their own internal
systems of autonomy. Important to Habermas's argument is that government,
political parties and the news media have become publicly inaccessible
organisations whose private agendas have become enmeshed and integrated with a
once independent public sphere distinct from government.

According to critics of Habermas's public sphere, the idea of universal access
should be taken as an ideal rather than an all-encompassing view of a collective
public within eighteenth century society. Ian Ward, for example, claims that
Habermas's public sphere was inaccessible to the illiterate and women whose main
role was considered to be tending to the home and caring for the family, otherwise
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known as the ·private sphere· (Ward. 1997). Therefore. since the driving force
behind the early public sphere was ·composed of bourgeois private persons
crystallizing around newspapers and journals· (Habermas. 1996. p. 366) certain
groups would be excluded from the circles of influence that provided a semblance
of social cohesion of its own making. Peter Dahlgren claims that as an ideal
concept. the public sphere ·retains an anchoring in critical theory. and to use the
term incorporates the media within a critical perspective on democracy" (Dahlgren.
1997. p. 9). That is. as a critical model used to realise the effectiveness of the news
media as a two-way information relay between communities and political
representatives. Habermas·s public sphere ·evokes wide-ranging critical reflection
on social structure. the concentration of power. cultural practices. and the dynamics
of the political process· (p. 9). Nicholas Garnham (cited in Reinecke. 1989. p. 14 7).
too. sees the public sphere and the ·principles it embodies as an ideal type against
which we canjudge existing social arrangements·.

It does not appear. however. that Habermas is blind to these criticisms

111

his

account of the rise of the bourgeois public sphere. Habermas adds that. although
the public sphere was considered a space in which rational debate took place in a
context of ·universal access' (Habermas. 1989. p. 219). this ideal was never truly
realised. even during its most effective period. There are reasons. however. that
Habermas persists with his argument of a degraded bourgeois public sphere.
Today, as much as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. the possibility of
inclusion for those outside the bourgeois public sphere always exists. However,
what Habermas is saying specific to a mediatised public sphere, in both the

Structural Transformation and his later work Between Facts and Norms (1996), is
that the conception of a public sphere has always had its roots fixed firmly within a
middle-class perspective. In addition, and contrary to criticisms that state
otherwise, Habermas accepts that there exist other public spheres, of minority and
interest groups, that can have an influence on civil society and its political function.
However, since the bourgeois model of the public sphere, and all forms of culture

that pass through it, have in themselves become commodities, there are fewer
possibilities of less powerful actors, on the periphery of commodity exchange,
being able to communicate effectively on a mainstream, or mass level.
It is true, as critics have pointed out, that the conditions that allowed for the
emergence of the bourgeois public sphere enabled the inclusion of minority groups.
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This reflects wider arguments that continue today about the degradation of the
public sphere through what are seen as lesser forms of mass popular culture and
entertainment (Ivison. 2003. p. 33). Habennas does not take issue with these fom1s
of culture as the main cause of the erosion of the public sphere. while still
maintaining that they certainly play a role in exacerbating and sustaining its
dysfunction. After all, Habennas acknowledges in his historical account of early
eighteenth century Europe that it was the publisher taking over the role of the
patron as the ·author's commissioner and

[organizer ofl the commercial

distribution of literary goods· (Habennas. 1989. p. 38) that led to a wider interested
reading public. albeit the propertied and educated class. In turn. this led to the
general public paying for the opportunity to attend theatres. museums and galleries
previously reserved for the courts. Public discussion on these cultural activities was
a natural part of this new environment. and it was this sequence of events that
finally led to the bourgeois public sphere that not only discussed high culture, but
also politics. The danger that arose, which is still prevalent today, is that powerful
actors can, and do. appropriate the public sphere to further their own ends. It can be
said of widespread mediated political debate, for example. that it has furthered the
public's understanding of politics and potentially offers the possibility of inclusion.
However, the reality is that political discourse is predominantly conducted between
politicians, journalists. analysts and other specialised political commentators. In
addition, the production of political discourse has been formalised. packaged and
produced for consumption, by another set of specialists, that stifles a fluid, rational
exchange of opinions emerging from other spheres of society. Deliberate or not,
political communication in Australia can be controlled and steered by those with
the means to do so, and accepted as a voice of normalised authority by those not
willing to critically examine its motives or veracity.
The political public sphere is all but closed to public participation, apart from the
one democratic right offered to them on election day. Parliament Question time, the
political arena where the public can supposedly view democracy at work via the

news media, broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation [ABC],
becomes an arena where 'instruction-bound appointees meet to put their
predetermined decisions on record' (Habermas, 1989, p. 205). Projected into the
public sphere in this way, these privately produced policies and opinions seek to
shape public opinion rather than inform and facilitate public debate between private
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members of the electorate. Subsequently. say social researchers such as Hugh
Mackay (McKay & Brown. 2004 ). the Australian electorate have become
disengaged ,vith politics. If this is true. it is perhaps not because the public find
politics boring. but because they have no meaningful part to play in the
rationalising of decisions that may affect them. Alexis de Tocqueville observed.
claims David lvison. that this chain of events has a constant reflexive effect on a
public where the less politically inclusive a public perceives itself to be. the more
apathetic to power they become (lvison. 2003. p. 31 ).
There is also the additional factor that the news media are themselves privately
owned organisations that are subject to: (a) government scrutiny: (b) the need to
attract advertisers (in the case of commercial news media): and (c) the need to
harness a loyal audience and readership. These factors ,vhen combined cultivate an
environment where

participation

and

acknowledgement of the

public

is

circumvented. and public debate reduced. With a greatly reduced role in political
affairs. in effect an apolitical public sphere. Habermas·s argument is predominantly
concerned with a public that is continually cast in the role of audience member
rather than active participant. He describes this as the refeudalisation of the public
sphere. where the public applaud power and authority the same way as they did
before aristocracy.

For a democracy to exist it needs an informed and politically engaged public. For
an informed and politically engaged public to exist there needs to be a free, incisive
and disinterested news media. The public sphere is now inhabited by the publicity
and advertising of competing private interests used to influence public opinion in
an effort to seek public acclamation on matters discussed privately.

IO

I. Criticism of Habermas 's Theory of an
Eroded Public Sphere
One way of describing Habennas· s theory of the public sphere in a clear manner is
to highlight one or two opposing arguments and misleading representations. For
example, Keith Windschuttle, Fixing the news ( 1981: 1988 and 2002), who has
been involved in journalism, media theory and history for many years. stands as a
critic of certain media and cultural theorists and their place in the Australian
education system. More specifically. arguments expressed by Windschuttle at a
keynote address at Queensland University of Technology, in 1998. and later
published in Quadrant (1999) entitled ·Cultural Studies Versus Journalism'. and
alternatively · Journalism Versus Cultural Studies· in Australian Studies .Journal
( 1998). are somewhat representative of reoccurring criticisms levelled at
Habennas·s theory of a degraded public sphere. By responding to a number of his
and other critics it is hoped that a clearer understanding of what Habermas 1s
attempting to achieve in his writings will emerge.
In reference to Habennas' s theory of the media, Windschuttle asks why academic
media theorists are still 'subjecting their students to such an intellectually and
politically discredited theory, which sheds absolutely no light on the way the media
operate?' (Windschuttle, 1998). In this particular case. Windschuttle' s approach is
misleading, as he is discussing two separate issues. Windschuttle conflates the
mechanics of journalism and with the societal representations that stem from such
systems, and as such his argument confuses function \\,1th meaning. It is true that
critics of the media may not have the benefit of having an insider's view of how a
television or newspaper runs on a technical level, but they can, however, see the
results of such processes. Critical theories of media and culture, such as
Habermas's, offer a perspective on the way in which society is framed through, for
example, hierarchies of race, gender, affluence and power, and why it is framed in
that way and not another. It also highlights the deficiencies inherent in systems of
the news media, where mediums such as television become arenas for ersatz public

debate that favours staged displays by political actors over public contributions.
Windschuttle's argument makes the assumption that if the journalistic mechanisms
work, then its product must be as close to objectivity as can be expected.
Windschuttle finds Habermas's theory improbable, perhaps thinking it unrealistic
to believe that the news media deliberately 'exclude oppositional voices, [prevent]
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rational debate, [have a] modus operandi [of] concealment and subterfuge',
consider their audience as ·either (a) mindless robots, or (b) fictional constructs that
exist solely in discourse' (Windschuttle, 1998). As a result Windshuttle's
vehement arguments miss Habermas's point entirely.
Habermas argues that there is a relentless passage of infom1ation pouring through
the channels of public communication from private organisations whose opinions
and agendas do not emerge from the public sphere itself. Habermas explains that
the public sphere is, or ideally should be, comprised of private individuals
discussing and forming opinions on everyday experiences. For each individual
person, it is the possibility of raising common concerns of everyday life experience
that ensure active participation in the process of debate. In society, everyday
experience often means how government decisions affect their lives directly, and
therefore public opinions on government perfom1ance are fom1ed based on this
discourse. Hence, public opinion emerging from virtual public spaces, the public
sphere, in this way fom1s the foundation of an open society.

However, Habermas discusses actors who exist autonomously outside the common
spheres of public discourse. These groups may include political parties,
corporations and government itself. who use their influence and power, both
economic and political, to gain acclamation and consent from the public to
legitimise and perpetuate their own existence and influence. In this environment of
mass communication, the role of the news media can be one that questions
government by facilitating public discourse on power, or they can act as a conduit
for those power groups in their attempts at further self-legitimation. Of course, the
news media are never exclusively 'either' a conduit or a critical eye on power;
there are far more states that lie between these two extremes. It is this latter
condition, however, that has contributed to the public sphere becoming eroded.
That is, people are now finding it difficult to distinguish between disinterested
public opinion and opinion aimed at acquiring their consent and ascension
(Habermas, 1989 & 1996).

In the media's expanded role from local community toward a more or less globally
mediated society, sociologist John Thompson, argues that Habermas's approach is
limited in its ability to truly understand the 'nature of public life' while:
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wedded to a conception of publicness \Vhich is essentially
spatial and dialogical in character, and which obliges us to
interpret the ever-growing role of mediated communication as a
fall from grace (Thompson. 1995. p. 132).

Thompson is arguing that Habermas's theory relies too heavily on the conditions of
commtmication

encountered

in

a

literal

public

space.

of communities.

Notwithstanding the fact that local and community based communications and
discourse are an a priori to extended national and international discourse.
Habermas responds to such criticisms of his theory of the public sphere in Bet,reen

Facts and 1Vorms (1996). In this later work Habermas claims that the public sphere
is not a static metaphorical reference to society: when Habem1as uses the term
·Jifeworld", for example. he is referring to a global public sphere. where boundaries
are constantly expanding. shrinking or splitting to accommodate social inclusion.
While it is believed that it was Edmund Husserl that first used the term, the manner
in which Habermas uses ·lifeworld' appears to carry on from Martin Heidegger·s
interpretation. In Habermas's work. as Giovanna Borradori explains:
The concept of world frees the public realm from the model of
eighteenth century European society in relation to which the
notion of a public sphere was first conceived (Borradori. 2003. p.
65).

This is true at all levels. from the public legitimation of the power elite to the
integration of minority groups who, after exerting sufficient pressure on
appropriate powers can influence, to varying degrees, the normative confines of a
society's value system.
Media theorists such as Tom Gitlin (in Liebes & Curran, 1998) and Duncan lvison
(in Lurnby & Probyn, 2003) argue that Habermas does not make allowances for the
integration of new technologies, such as the Internet, that allow for less powerful
actors to have a significant influence on mainstream society. As a result of, and in
addition to, this alleged oversight made by Habermas, other social spheres of
influence, which Gitlin refers to as 'sphericules', created by lesser powers are

ignored. Therefore, they claim, by excluding such possibilities Habermas' s
conclusions rely exclusively on the specific communicative conditions that a
singular public sphere generates. However, even in his earlier works Haberrnas
presents us with a number of different spheres within, and external to, 'the'
bourgeois public sphere: the episodic, such as taverns and coffee houses; and the
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occasional, in the form of public presentations and events. Habermas's conceptions

of various types of public spheres, and how he relates the developing forms of
communication, contradict claims that his theory does not encompass multi spheres
or allow for future forms of communication. He even talks of an abstract sphere,
where consumers of mass media are brought together across vast geographical
areas:
The one text of "the" public sphere, a text continually
extrapolated and extending radially in all directions, is divided
by internal boundaries into arbitrarily small texts for which
everything else is context; yet one can always build
hermeneutical bridges from one text to the next (Habermas,
1996, p. 374).

Examples such as this demonstrate that the public sphere is neither a sphere nor
that it is static and limiting in trying to determine the normative state of a society;
characteristics and functions of the public sphere change in parallel to the way a
society communicates and, therefore, is only as limited as society itself. Habermas
is not viewing publicness 'through the lens of the traditional model' (Thompson,
1995, p. 132) of communication, as Thompson states, but rather using previous
models and forms of communication as a control state by which to measure
succeeding ones, and the effect that they have on society. Habermas's model works
on the basis of a continuing progression and comparison of communication models
and publicity used to make some sense out of extremely complex human social
networks.
This is quite different from saying that news media organisations are against while there is a chance they might be - rational debate. Neither can it be said that
arguments from commentators such as Habermas claim that these organisations'
'modus operandi is concealment and subterfuge' (Windschuttle, 1998). Habermas's
criticisms of news media organisations contends that it is the corporatised structure
of these organisations, not an intentional 'modus operandi', which determines the
prioritisation of certain stories, and story angles. In fact, throughout his work
Habermas is arguing that, conditionally, any formalised organisational structures of
communication tend to detract from informaL unstructured, interpersonal networks
comprised of private citizens communicating and debating matters that affect them.
In this way, it can be said that organisations set on creating publicity to legitimate
their own existence or a consumer interest around a product to be sold, that is not
14

derived from citizens' own personal experiences within the 'lifeworld', and is
primarily for the benefit of the organisation itself and citizens second - if at all does not constitute public opinion from the public sphere itself (Habermas, 1996,
pp. 360 & 379). Under these conditions there is an allowance for organisations that
do emerge from the public sphere and whose primary purpose is contributing
toward citizens' and community needs more or less directly, or to allow a minority
group to be recognised as a legitimate part of society where previously they were
once discriminated against or seen as a threat to that society (p. 373). One example
of a structural priority, however, is the need for commercial broadcast news
organisation to stay commercially viable in a competitive market. In discussing
television commercial news media, Fiske states that news is an expensive
commodity that relies on advertisements, and therefore needs to be popular and
produce an audience that will attract more advertisers (Fiske, 1991, p. 281).
Windschuttle's argument that media theory assumes a passive unthinking audience
of 'mindless robots' is also baseless. When Windschuttle presented this argument
at the Queensland University of Technology in 1998, Habermas had already stated,
in his text Between Facts and Norms (1996), that even though research on the
effects of media on an audience remains controversial:
The research on effect and reception has at least done away with
the image of passive consumers as cultural dopes who are
manipulated by the programs offered to them (Habermas, 1996,
p. 377).

Here is evidence that Habermas believes in an actively thinking, critical audience.
Habermas's argument explains that the public sphere has become congested with
competing commercial, government and a myriad of interest and lobby groups that
interact with one another while simultaneously omitting the public. It is
disingenuous for Windschuttle, and others who share his view, to argue that
Habermas believes in the existence of a mindless or passive audience. These
criticisms serve to highlight the very controversial nature of what Habermas is
saying. That is, despite our existence within a democratic society where minority
groups have the opportunity in which to make their case in pursuit of inclusion, the
interests of those with power, wealth and social influence will most often prevail.
These actors have a greater opportunity to distort the channels of communication,
and as a result make the public sphere an ineffectual arena for public political
debate.
15

Questions that George Soros. financier and philanthropist, raises over freedom of
speech and democracy in American society points to \vhat seems a self-evident
state of the ne\vs media, and the implications for democracy. Soros considers that,
even though there is a free media in the United States, there is a \Vay for the ·facts'
to be manipulated and distorted, but questions hmv it is ·possible to distort facts in
an open society' (Soros. 2004). Habermas argues that the public sphere's function
of allowing private citizens to critically debate publicly has been compromised by
the competing interests of privately owned organisations. and opinion that is
derived from publicity that displaces the pub] ic · s role in rational-critical debate.
Critical debate is no longer public among organisations that have great influence on
a public that has. in turn. a great dependency on some of these organisations. As a
result the general public. the electorate. have lost their forum. and perhaps
motivation, in which to come together as citizens. The corporatised model of
society has. by default, relegated the pub] ic to the roles of audience, spectator and
consumer. In his Struc:tural Tramformation of the Public Sphere ( 1989), Habermas
refers to the public as a · great mass of consumers whose receptiveness is public but
uncritical' (Habermas, 1989, p. 175). By this he means that society is divided into
·suppliers' and ·consumers·, and given these conditions. public communication
provides fewer opportunities for a public to be critical of power. The electorate are
not dupes or robots but they are most likely frustrated with a media and political
system that reduces their role as citizen to spectator of political events managed by
organisations and interest groups outside of their sphere of influence.
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2. The Appropriation of the Public Sphere
2.1. The voter as spectator

In the Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), Habermas argues
that at its heart the mass media is a culture of integration, and as a result has
brought about the death of a public sphere independent of government self
promotion and propaganda. By this he means that the public sphere, which should
ideally be informed by a disinterested press, is no longer solely comprised of
private individuals coming together as a public to debate and form opinions that
inform the polity. Instead, government, private organisations and corporations are
groups external to, and use their influence on, the public sphere in ways that attract
publicity and legitimate their presence over their rivals. That is, an autonomous
organisation's privately formed opinions are promoted publicly principally to
accomplish public acclamation, rather than to enrich public debate. Today, as with
most businesses, economic forces govern the news media, which means that they
need to draw in a loyal and consistent audience base. To achieve this, the news
media have a tendency to fuse and present political information in a stylised form,
a narrative that blends both guidance and entertainment to attract public interest. As
autonomous businesses in their own right, news media organisations are
predominantly driven by a requirement for human interest (Habermas, 1989, p.
175). The combination of political bodies and the news media seeking the
acclamation of the public via staged publicity has resulted in events such as
election campaigns making the public sphere an inadequate arena for public
political debate. Habermas claims that the public sphere itself now assumes
'advertising functions', where the more the public sphere 'can be deployed as a
vehicle for political and economic propaganda, the more it becomes unpolitical as a
whole and pseudo-privatised' (p. 175). During an election campaign, information,
as political news media, has two aims. The first of these is the need of government
and political parties to generate positive public interest in their policies and
themselves. The other is the news media's own necessary objective in attracting
audiences to their news programs (p. 178). In regard to a functioning public sphere,
the twin objectives of these organisations are incompatible and inadequate if the
intention is to engender informed political understanding derived from rational
critical debate.
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According to research conducted by the Australi911 Broadcasting Authority [ABA],
on media audiences and where they source their news and current affairs
information, a large proportion of Australians acquire their news media from
traditional sources. The ABA's findings show that:
Free to air television remains the most used source for news
and current affairs with nearly 88 per cent of Australians
using it followed by 76 per cent listening to the radio and 76
per cent reading newspapers. National Nine News is the
leader amongst free to air viewers (Australian
Broadcasting Authority, 2000).
It would therefore be a fair assumption to suggest that many Australians follow the
progress of an election via these traditional news media sources. In this respect, the
news media are burdened with a great responsibility as they decide how an election
should be covered, and how the policies and the candidates responsible for them
are represented to the public. Notwithstanding this responsibility, it would initially
seem that the dissemination of political information could only lead to stronger
public debate within the public sphere. Contrary to this assumption is Habermas's
claim that public debate has actually suffered due to the development of private
organisations and corporations' dominance in society. Habermas claims that the:
public use of reason is shattered; the public is split apart into
minorities of specialists who put their reason to use non
publicly and the great mass of consumers whose
receptiveness is public but uncritical (Habermas, 1989, p.
175).
This criticism would suggest that news media organisations run the risk of
becoming little more than a conduit for political publicity and propaganda for the
major party candidates involved. While not assuming that the news media directly
and deliberately influence the public on political issues, it can be said that the news
media and political parties interact and relegate the citizen to the role of spectator
rather than political actor.
Sociologist John Thompson argues that election campaigns are planned media
events, where campaign coverage is a pre-planned, coordinated activity between
the political participants and the news media intended to disrupt regular
programmmg (Thompson, 1995, pp. 107-108). This implies that the voter is
positioned as a spectator during an election campaign, rather than being a political
18

participant. From the very beginning of the six-week campaign, immediately after
Prime Minister John Howard announced the election date on the 29 August 2004.
the news media presented it as a spectacle. an event. On Perth ·s STW9 evening
news. Nine Network's national political commentator Laurie Oakes (STW9 Nev,s.
29 August 2004) sounded as though he was commentating a horse race: ·They're
offl The PM fired the starters gun \Vhen he drove to Yarralumla to get approval
from Governor Jeffery·. Accompanying Oakes·s commentary \Vas some fast-paced
video editing displaying a white limousine driving through the Yarralumla gates.
As the story swiftly unfolded. a sound bite from Prime Minister Hov,ard (STW9
Ne\vs. 2004) made him sound like a boxer ready to enter the ring: ·Oh. yes! Tough
fighf. The t\vo leaders were positioned as combatants even further when Oakes
claimed that Labor had launched an 'all-out attack on Howard's credibility'. and
that Mr Howard had ·met the challenge head on by declaring the election will be
about trust'. The juggernaut of video footage continued. and additional grabs of
John Howard asking 'who do you trust?' were juxtaposed with Mark Latham
claiming that the present 'government had been dishonest for too long·. j\/ine 's
story ended by questioning the credibility and worthiness of either leader. Oakes
claimed that Latham· s campaign agenda \Vas a 'rehash· of an earlier speech that he
had given nearly a year before, and that John Howard was yet to face 'further
embarrassment' in the Senate over the children overboard affair.
In this brief, fast-paced story, Nine Neirs focused on the physical accoutrements
and symbols of power, politics and the personas of the leaders themselves, with the
leaders positioned as competitors in a manner usually reserved for sports men and
women. This highlights a news media predominantly concerned with characters
and personalities in politics, rather than in promoting public discourse. Habermas
even refers to this kind of treatment of democracy as the 'refeudalisation' of the
public sphere, observing that: 'the "suppliers" display a showy pomp before
customers ready to follow' (Habermas, 1989, p. 195). As a result, Channel Nine's
coverage of the first day of the election campaign looked more like an opening

ceremony for a sporting event than the commencement of an election. The term
'suppliers' can be taken to mean both the news media and politicians, who equally
share a vested interest in cultivating a culture of information consumption, not
formation, among the electorate. In this way, the process of informing the public on
political matters is disseminated in a top down manner (p. 177) from government,
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political parties and interest groups, via the opinions and analysis of political
journalists, experts and commentators.
While news media is produced in a style that is considered entertaining in order to
attract the attention of the electorate, there are arguments that claim that this has
little to offer viewers in the way of political information. Graeme Turner observes
that television news and current affairs programs, especially political debates, are
regarded as too boring for audiences to watch. As a result only the most high
profile political issues succeed in being broadcast on television. 'Political analysis
on television limps along in 30-second grabs on national news reports, or in poorly
resourced interviews on the 7.30 Report or Lateline' (Turner, 2003, p. 144). Even a
cursory glance at news and current affairs content reflects these observations.
During the first weeks of the election campaign, the story order on local Perth
commercial news stations had either the Beslan school siege, or progress reports on
a cyclone threatening the Florida coast, as the lead stories.

Local news content profiled highly, such as on 5 September, 2004 when, following
the lead Beslan siege story, Perth's STW9 news reported a four car 'head on'
collision occurring on a road between Mandurah and Bunbury. This observation
correlates with a 1995 study (cited in Firth, 1999, p. 63) of Sydney's Channel
Seven, where it was shown that Seven's editors kept news 'simple and local' in
fear of losing their audience, and that 'foreign news on free-to-air commercial
television is brief, dramatic and entertaining rather than searching or analytical'.
This is because most foreign policy issues are deemed 'too complicated to lend
themselves to popular media treatment' (p.63). Election coverage was always in the
second half of the half hour news program, and was comprised mainly of brief
'grabs' of the key political players, opposition leader Mark Latham, Prime Minister
John Howard and Senator Bob Brown. In contrast, The ABC usually covered the
progress of the election campaign first, and in slightly more detail, except during
and after the Beslan school siege. The ABC used very similar footage, or grabs, as
the commercial stations. If there was a major development that included extended
visuals of the leaders on the campaign trail, or there was a political scandal, this
would usually make the headlines on the commercial stations. This pattern was
repeated throughout the election campaign.
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Kevin McQuillan considers that the similarities between footage and stories used
are a waste of resources. McQuillan claims that the findings of his report
(Appendix: A), commissioned by Chris Anderson, a former Chief Executive of
Optus and current board member of Publishing and Broadcasting Limited (PBL),
support a move for the pooling of resources between news media organisations.
McQuillan claims that in the United States resource-sharing between networks:
happens on a daily basis in Washington, where each network
in a pool will take responsibility for covering the White
House, providing the crew, reporter and uplink on White
House press conferences (McQuillan, 2004).

Participants in a focus group that Michael Pusey conducted for his book The
£,:,:perience ol Middle Australia: The Dark Side ol Economic Refhrm (2003 ), have

already expressed general anxieties and mistrust of the 'sensationalism', 'bias' and
the 'Americanisation' of the media (Pusey, 2003, p. 136), where the '[p]olitical
dialogue in the United States has degenerated into a welter of rhetorical flourishes
and abstract platitudes' (Boggs, 2000, p. 47). Further moves to consolidate the
relationships between news media organisations would surely only exacerbate
public perceptions of sensationalism even fmiher. Regardless of Anderson's
motives in commissioning such a study, the approach seems to miss the point of the
much broader problem of all news media organisations gravitating toward, as
Turner argues, the most high profile political issues. It is a problem because often
the most high profile political story is not the most publicly relevant, and is sought
after by media organisations because of the publicity surrounding it rather than its
substance and significance.
In discussing the libertarian and social responsibility models of journalism. Sally
White claims that the news media's role in the 'democratic process is ultimately
more important than its economic function and individual media organisations can
be exempt from having to earn their way in the market place· (White, 1991. p. 9).
The way in which journalism has been infused with other types of mediatised
information has weakened the idea of the liberal model, and weakened journalism.
The speed, volume and corifiguration of mass media content favour those who
distribute rather than the consumers who receive the information (Borradori, 2003,
p.57), and the cacophony of news, entertainment and advertising 'comes together
to form a syndrome that works to depoliticise public communication' (Habermas,
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1996, p. 3 77). Freelance journalist John Pilger claims that the term journalism has
had a shift in meaning, and believes that the distinction that we now have between
journalism and 'investigative journalism' is misleading. That is, all journalism

should be considered investigative. Most importantly, 'investigative' journalism
'refuses to accept the press release version of events. It looks behind facades. It is
always sceptical of authority, of vested interest, of governments (Pilger, 2004). It is
the 'different conditions of communication', claims Habermas (Habermas, 1996,
pp. 366-367), that determine how information is channelled and regulated between
the private and public spheres, and how permeable each is to the other. Without
communication channels available to the public that they can feel confident will
provide the possibility for actual political participation, politics becomes
impoverished, and people lose interest.
Prior to the election, social researcher Hugh MacKay's qualitative research was
showing that the electorate's desire, or inclination, to play an active role in politics
had declined. Early in April, on both the ABC's 7.30 Report (Latharn's popularity
plunges, 2004) and Channel Ten's political program Meet the Press (McKay &
Brown, 2004 ), MacKay stated that recent political developments in Australia have
been taking place 'in the context of a pretty disengaged electorate, people who are
not riveted by these issues'. On the 7. 3 0 Report, MacKay (Latham's popularity
plunges, 2004) claimed that nothing '[Opposition leader] Mark Latham has said
has really had any impact on the fundamental drivers that are going to determine
the outcome of the next election - which are the economy and this whole bogey of
national security'. On Meet the Press, MacKay (McKay & Brown, 2004) stated
that 'this is not an electorate engaged with politics. I find it still quite hard to get
people to say anything about federal politics'. MacKay's remarks reflect past
international comparative studies of television viewing in trilateral nations. In these
countries, 'including Australia, heavy TV use is associated with lower civic
involvement and less interest in discussing politics' (Pusey, 2003, p. 128). In
connection to these findings. an additional disincentive may be that with the
prevalence of so many political commentators available, such as Paul Kelly, Paul
Bongiorno, Laurie Oakes, Kerry O'Brien, Tony Jones, Maxine McKew and
Michael Brissenden to name but a few, perhaps people no longer believe that
politics is within their grasp, possibly feeling too intimidated to talk about a topic
on which they believe they have no knowledge. Or the prevalence of such political

22

'experts' somehow relinquishes political participation from an alienated public. Or
put another way, their existence can have the added effect of relieving the public
from using or relying on their own critical abilities on political matters.
The divide between sender and receiver demonstrates what Habermas (1989, pp.
216-217) refers to as a 'periodically manufactured public sphere' in which the
news media operate as an advertising vehicle for political parties. As private
autonomous organisations in their own right, both the news media and political
parties:
develop their own internal systemic logics and push the
citizen into the peripheral role of mere organization member.
They explode the model of a polity that determines itself
through the shared practice of the citizens themselves
(Habermas, 1996, p. 505).
However, an audience watching, reading or listening to news media coverage may
get the impression that the journalists and production team consider themselves
independent of the political display, rather than being an integral part of its
construction. Media analyst Rodney Tiffen, for example, argues that the news
media like to portray the image that 'they are reporting a campaign which exists
independently of them' (Tiffen, 1989, p. 127). It is an attitude that contributes
further to the construction of a manufactured public sphere, as neither are
independent of one another, and each relies heavily upon the other for success in
the lead up to, and during, an election campaign. To some commentators this
relationship is a false, misleading and redundant one. For example, Rodney
Cavalier (cited in Bean, Simms, Bennett & Warhurst, 1997, p.31 ), an ALP
campaigner and government MP since the 1960s, states that: 'the great mistake of
campaign reportage is that it treats an election as an event worthy of narrative. An
election is a process largely invisible' [italics added]. However, Cavalier's

statement is axiomatic as it is precisely because elections, and political processes in
general, are now so 'invisible' that a constructed narrative of events has become a
necessary element in any news media coverage of an election campaign. Why they
have become invisible to the public will be discussed in the next two sections on
political debates and public opinion.
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2.2. Mediated political debates
Historian Eric Hobsbawm explains that politicians' reluctance to speak their mind
in public can be attributed to the rise of mass political parties, mass media, and a
subsequent widespread democratic fervour that these developments caused. The
developing politics of mass propaganda and mass media posed a new set of
problems for politicians and, along with the rise of democratic libertarian notions
of the press. politicians and ruling classes found it prudent to avoid being drawn
into discussions on democracy and the implications for the power elite that it may
bring. With every word being carried by reporters to households everywhere,
politicians found it increasingly advantageous to avoid saying what they actually
'

meant (Hobsbawm, 1997, pp. 87-88). As a consequence, claims Hobsbamn, 'what
intelligent observer could overlook the yawning gap between public discourse and
political reality (p. 88). Regardless of these observations, we still tend to, have to,
rely on individuals in the news media to gamer useful information from politicians
and authority figures. Tiffen claims that the news media are 'the central forum of
political communication' and, therefore, also a 'key arena of political conflict'
(Tiffen, 1989, p. 5). As far as democratic debate is concerned, however, the
·conflict' is publicly staged and broadcast. and represents public opinion only in a
very narrow way.
Habermas claims that mediated political debates and interviews have become
commodities. Where debate and political forums were once based on critical
reviews of cultural production, discussion itself is now a consumer item.
Habermas, while accepting that the commercialisation of cultural goods is one way
in which to cultivate rational-critical debate. observes that debate itself should be
·excluded from the exchange relationships of the market' (Habermas, 1989. p.
164). For Habermas, commercially produced cultural and political debates indicate
a shift away from private people debating political matters as a public of equals, as
·human beings' (p. 164). That is, we may tend to have more of an opinion on what
politicians and experts being interviewed have to say, rather than our own opinions
that evolve from everyday experiences. This is also true in regard to the topics to
be raised. In discussing the relationship between politicians and the press gallery,
Don Watson observes that: 'The media determine the form and, very often, the
subject of debate' (Watson, 2002, p. 51). One may assume that this would have the
desired effect of holding politicians to account, but as anyone who has seen a
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politician being interviewed would know. this is not so. The way in which a
political intervie\v or debate is structured, following fonnalised rules. etiquette and
presentation (Habennas. 1989, p. 164). in addition to the adherence to time
constraints and the strict question-and-answer system. does not often foster quality
debate (Beresford, 1997, pp. 58-60).
This was cetiainly true of the centrepiece debate that the ne\VS media built up to
during the campaign. The ·Great Debate·. as it is called, \Vas televised live on the
Nine Network's 60 kfinutes, which 2001 host, Ray Mmiin. referred to as 'the
national broadcaster·. Before the commencement of the 2004 ·Great Debate·, the
host, Charles Wooley (Great Debate. 2004), described Nine·s live coverage of the
Great Debate as the only occasion when the two leaders meet for a 'face-to-face
encounter·. While this may perhaps be considered a coup for the Nine Network. it
is a poor reflection of our political and news media systems. This means that on
only one occasion do the public get to see each leader's ideas and opinions being
tested by their political opponent, let alone being tested by other party leaders or,
for that matter, a live audience. In place of audience questions the same old
political experts, and senior journalists are left to ask the difficult questions. The
panel was comprised of: Malcolm Farr from the Daily Telegraph; Neil Mitchell
from Radio 3A W in Melbourne; Michelle Grattan from the Age and the ABC's
chief political correspondent, Jim Middleton, with Laurie Oakes acting as
moderator. In contrast, the public are again removed from political participation,
such as directing questions to the party leaders on live television, and are instead
relegated to providing statistical information via the 'worm'.

The worm is a box with a dial that can be used by a member of a live audience
watching the debate to respond by turning a dial left or right in accordance with
how well they think a politician is responding to a question. A graph is produced
from the collated results that represents the performance of the politicians during
the debate. However, as has already been discussed, we are never really sure as to
why the audience liked or disliked what is being said. They may not have liked

John Howard's tie for all we know. Furthermore, without questions from the public
the debate may have missed the opportunity for topics such as indigenous affairs
and the environment, which were not covered in the debate. Featuring heavily were
the areas of national security, health, the economy and workplace relations, and the
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panel obliged by staying with these themes. While this media event between the
two leaders may enlighten some viewers to campaign issues, the leaders rarely
strayed from their campaign messages, and offered little in the way of new
information.
The task, then, 1s for the interviewer, through comprehensive and incisive
questioning, to try and expose irregularities in any policy, not just the face value
benefits advocated by the politician. Despite the best efforts of an interviewer,
however, political interviews rarely achieve any new insight outside the policy's
initial media release. Speaking from his experience as a political interviewer for
the ABC's 7.30 Report, Kerry O'Brien (cited in Irving, 2004) recalls one technique
politicians use to get a political message across during what is supposed to be an
interview. The technique involves drawing:
breath mid sentence, rather than at the end of a sentence, so
that they can charge on with their answer and not give you a
gap to get your next question in.

In using 'tricks of the trade' such as this, a politician can control an interview; they
can simultaneously eat into the interviewer's valuable question time while
favourably promoting a policy, their own party, or themselves. Early in the
election campaign, Lateline 's Tony Jones queried the Prime Minister (cited in 'PM
defends', 2004) about a promise that he made, while in opposition in 1995, to the
electorate. In 1995 Howard proclaimed that: 'I can promise you we will follow
policies which will, over a period of time, bring down the foreign debt'. At that
time the trade deficit was $194 billion. According to Jones, since John Howard's
government came to power this figure has risen to $393 billion. Jones (PM
defends, 2004) asked Howard: 'Now why didn't you keep that key economic
promise?' Jones rephrased this question in numerous ways during the interview,
but John Howard chose not to address the question directly and instead supplied
answers that linked interest rates to Labor's economic record. The following quote
is representative of the type of response Howard supplied throughout the course of
the interview:
out there where people have high mortgages, they are
sensitive to interest rate movements and they will look at the
record of my Government over the last eight-and-a-half
years, they will remember the 17 per cent interest rates of
Paul Keating and Bob Hawke (PM defends, 2004).
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John Howard used the time available to follow the Liberal-Coalition campaign
strategy, which was attacking the economic credibility of the Labor party while
advertising the government's own economic management team of Howard and
Costello. While Howard was given the opportunity on ABC's Lateline to explain
to the public why the trade deficit is so high, and how his government was going to
remedy it, he decided to remain evasive.
British studies of the political interview further confirm that politicians and the
news media are not necessarily a politically informative mix, and merely give the
impression of in-depth debate. According to Peter Bull, there are a number of
identifiable characteristic features associated with the political interview: 'the
distinctive pattern of tum taking, the high frequency of interruptions and
equivocation, and the importance of face management and self-presentation',
where a 'politician's skills in face management in interviews becomes of central
importance' (Bull, 1998, p. 158). The study conducted by Bull and Mayer revealed
that politicians provide substantially less direct replies, a difference on average of
40%, to questions compared with non-political interviewees (p. 152). Another
study conducted by Bavelas demonstrated how a politician's 'communicative
situation' predicted an equivocation as a result of the question being impossible to
answer without damaging either their own party, another party affiliate, or a
segment of the public. This was referred to as an 'avoidance-avoidance' scenario.
In this situation it is the potential mistakes that a politician can make that may win
or lose support from an electorate or significant other (p. 153). These 'aggressive'
interview tactics, generally speaking, are more likely to be seen on shows such as
the ABC's Lateline, and 7.30 Report. However, as already noted, this approach in
itself does not guarantee a successful interview if the interviewee remains
obstructive and chooses not to participate.
Comparatively, a third study revealed that not all questions are as adversely
deterministic, and can in fact have a favourable result for the politician. This type
of question, unlike the awkward Bavelas questions, can be answered with what is
called a 'non-necessary threat' response where politicians can make positive
statements about himself or herself and the party that the politician represents. Of
course, it also allows for the discrediting of opponents (p. 156). Predictably, the
majority of politicians analysed chose to give 'non-necessary threat' responses to
27

such questions (p. 156). Tiffen states that in relation to policy 'there are more costs
than benefits in being specific.' Where 'the extra detail may provide a target for
opponents to attack, and increase the likelihood of a gaffe' (Tiffen, 1989, p. 140).
What most people who do not watch current affairs see, however, is the doorstop
interview during the nightly news that relies on the 'sound bite'. The doorstop
interview is when a politician is seen getting out of a car, or entering/leaving a
location, a scenario that allows them freedom to say what they like and avoid
difficult questions. 'The advantage of using sound bites, particularly for
commercial news channels, is their brevity and entertainment value' (Payne, 1999,
p. 100). Dr Trish Payne, a lecturer in communication studies, highlights the varying
approaches and attitudes toward journalistic standards when she quotes Agnes
Warren, of the ABC's Media Report, who claims that politicians take advantage of
the brevity of commercial media, while appearing to sound as though they are
giving both sides of a complex argument.
If the public have in fact become despondent about mediated politics, a response to

this, claims Brian McNair, may be an 'aggressive, adversarial journalism, in the
form of tough interviewing techniques ... as they constitute visible displays of the
vulnerability and accessibility of political elites' (McNair, 2002, p. 201). There are
sometimes occasions when the interviewer does manage to crack the political
surface, and some vulnerability shows through. According to Stuart Firth,
'governments worry about the media because the media influences public opinion',
but 'mass public opinion about much of Australia's foreign policy hardly exists'
(Firth, 1999, p. 65). Government controls the agenda on foreign policy, and it
would be a fair assumption to say they would like to keep it that way (p. 65). So,
when the news media attain some piece of significant material that may jeopardises
public support for the Iraq war, for example, the government attempts to neutralise
and discredit the story.

While interviewing the Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, Lateline 's Tony
Jones was attempting to gain more information about the Australian Defence
Force's (ADF) involvement, if any, in the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuses. Jones
already had some background information that linked an ADF legal officer, Major
O'Kane, to the drafting of a letter to the Red Cross in December. Jones asked
Downer whether it 'disturbed' him that the letter stated that for 'security reasons
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some internees at Abu Ghraib would not be given the protection of the Geneva
Conventions?' (Downer plays down, 2004). On this particular night Downer was
on the defensive, as the O'Kane revelations had become headline news among
nearly all the news organisations. Downer claimed he had not seen the letter, and
that this was a desperate attempt to involve Australians in the prisoner abuse
scandal. Downer, indignant, argued that: 'to suggest that an Australian was
involved in the drafting or a partial drafting of some letter'. At this point, midsentence. however, Downer changes tact before continuing with: 'the person who
signed the letter is the person who's responsible for the letter'. However, Jones
challenged Downer about what he knew, asking whether he was disputing that an
Australian had helped draft the letter or not. During the course of the interview
Downer claimed that the ABC and the Labor party had colluded to make an
argument 'that somehow there was an Australian involvement in these Abu Ghraib
atrocities' (Downer plays down, 2004). He also accused Jones of 'impugning the
integrity' of ADF officers, when Jones was actually trying to show that there was a
collapse in communication between Foreign Affairs. the Defence Department and
officers in Iraq. Furthermore, Downer referred to the idea of prisoners at Abu
Ghraib not having the protection of the Geneva Convention as 'some legal
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions' (Downer plays down, 2004).
When Jones asked Downer why O'Kane was not permitted to give evidence before
a Senate Estimates Committee on matters relating to Abu Ghraib, Downer again
aligned the ABC with the Labor Party, claiming that: 'this is the line the Labor
Party run' (Downer plays down, 2004). Downer tried yet another tack by asking
Jones the questions and what he thought Senate Estimates Committee hearings
were for. Answering his own question, Downer said:
They are supposed to be about the financial estimates of
government departments. . .. You've got Senator Faulkner
going in the Senate Estimates abusing public servants,
humiliating public servants and then demanding people
come before a Senate committee (Downer plays down.
2004).

However, on the government's own parliamentary website it clearly states that:
One of the most significant features of the procedure for
examining estimates is the opportunity that senators have to
question officers of the public service directly . . . The
provision of facts and figures is a necessary but not
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sufficient condition of accountability. What is needed to
complete the picture is for the relevant officials to explain,
not only the details of the 'what' and the 'how', but also the
'why' of departmental administration (Senate's Legislation
Committees, 200 I).
Furthermore, any evidence tabled in an estimates enquiry cannot be done so m
secret, and all documents given in evidence become public (2001 ), which could be
problematic for a government attempting to silence debate on a controversial topic.
Foreign Minister Downer's performance on Lateline demonstrates how politicians,
faced with a difficult series of questions, attempt to avoid responsibility or
ownership of a negative issue being addressed by the interviewer. The technique is
used to shut down debate, that is, give the impression of debate while trying not to
reveal crucial information that can hold government to account. As McNair
suggests, however, an adept and prepared interviewer can on occasion at least
reveal some vulnerabilities.

2.3. Public Opinion
During the early stages of the six-week campaign, the 7.30 Report's Kerry O'Brien
stated that, tongue in cheek, 'at this stage [of the campaign] we are not quite sure
who is listening'. It may be that the electorate were not interested in the policy
issues, but it is the business of political parties and government to at least have
some idea of who is listening to them. Commercial media organisations, for
example, need to know their audience and what will draw and hold their attention
long enough for advertisers to take advantage of audience attentiveness
(Cunningham & Turner, 2002, p. 87). To effectively target a specific audience,
consumer group or an electorate, political parties and news media organisations
measure the public attitudes via opinion polls and surveys. The rationale behind
their use is that it makes public opinion more or less predictable, and subsequently
taking some of the guesswork out of policy decisions (Mills, 1986, p. 43). Polling
may inform, for example, how a government minister should behave and respond
during media interviews. Michel Foucault's writings on discipline incorporate the
scientific study of populations as a means by which governments can control
population. Knowing detailed movements and characteristics of populations, for
example, led to the recognition of the conjugal family as an economic unit that
could be incorporated into the state.
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Foucault, (cited in Burke, 2003, p. 270) observes that 'discipline was never more
important or more valorised than at the moment when it become [sic] important to
manage a population'. The use of opinion polls is the positivist contrast to
Habermas's definition of open and civil society that itself legitimates
representatives of power through informed public debate (Habermas, 1989, p.
236). Habermas believes that because public opinion should be derived from
rational-critical debate as 'public opinion is not representative in the statistical
sense. It is not an aggregate of individually gathered, privately expressed opinions
held by isolated persons' (Habermas, 1996, p. 362). Armed with polling results
that define a population's demography, advertising and public relations agencies
may embark on a campaign to promote a product that not only 'solidifies the
profile of the brand and a clientele of consumers but mobilizes for the firm or
branch or for an entire system a quasi-political credit' (Habermas, 1989, p. 194).
Neil Postman argues that many of these polls and surveys use push polling
anyway, where the answer already lies in the question, that is 'the public's opinion
on almost any issue will be the function of the question asked' (Postman, 1993, p.
134). When political parties and government use the same methods as corporations
to attract publicity, Australia's entire political system and political functions are
corrupted. A government that seeks public acclamation derived from private or
undebated opinion is embarking on a process of public control rather than allowing
a society to determine itself by the will of the people.
Neil Postman states that:
The question is as yet undecided whether knowledge of voter
trends during a political campaign enriches or demeans the
electoral process. But when polls are used to guide public
policy, we have a different sort of issue altogether'
(Postman, 1993, pp. 132-133).

An opinion is not a static object that can be measured, 'it is a process of thinking'
(p. 134). When political parties and news media organisations use techniques that
bypass rational discourse, they become both the creators and purveyors of their
own news and policy. Turner claims that there was some consternation when the
'Australian began commissioning its Newspoll surveys and then publishing its

interpretations of the results as front-page stories' (Turner, 1996, p. 44). The frontpage headline of The West Australian on election day, for example, read: 'AND
THE WINNER IS HOWARD, SAY POLLS' (Dodson & Taylor, 2004, p. 1). The
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headline was based on the latest ACNielsen poll. Under the bold headline, there is
a large picture of Latham and Howard locked in a long and awkward handshake.
As they passed each other in a radio station corridor, Latham vigorously grasped
the Prime Minister's hand and closing in quickly hovered over him in what looked
like deliberate intimidation. Anyone who watched any television news during the
campaign would have seen this confrontation repeated ad infinitum. The West

Australian ·s headline positions the reader to view Howard as a rational, humble
bloke, over the irrational, bullying Mark Latham. Together, the photograph and the
ACNielsen poll, as Turner rightly points out, is 'creating news, not reporting it' (p.
44). The use of polls is a good way for the news media to generate a story that may
otherwise not have existed. Consequently, analysis and speculative commentary on
polls and the competition between leaders that it generates, feeds · ... into the
general picture reinforcing their images as winners and losers' (Ti ffen, 1989. p.
144).
The integration of disparate information and marketing techniques used by
corporations and political parties contributes to the distortion of public
communications that further depoliticises the public sphere. For example, just prior
to the election in 1996, Four Corners reporter Liz Jackson asked Prime Minister
Howard: 'when did you change your view that Medicare was a total disaster?
When did you change your view that bulk billing was a rort' (Jackson, 1996).
Howard responded by claiming that the 'Australian people like Medicare and they
want to keep it'. Howard continued by saying that •anybody who has the same
view year in and year out, irrespective of the expression of public opinion, is
stupid' (Jackson. 1996). Since coming to power John Howard has attempted to
associate his party with the traditional Labor Party policy area of health.
Strategically speaking, one would imagine that in a tightly contested two party
race, this was in effort to neutralise any political advantage the Labor Party may
gain from the association between health and the ALP. In this sense. the
relationship between the two parties closely resembles the rivalry between two

corporations fighting over market share.

Nicholas Ind, a corporate brand theorist, cites research, conducted by the Opinion
Research Corporation

[ORC], that

'demonstrates the

importance of an

organisation's reputation and the management of that reputation' (Ind, 1997, p.
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57). One of the main statements posed by ORC that most executives agreed upon
was that:
when several companies' products or services are similar in
quality or price, the companies' respective corporate
reputation often determines which service the customer will
buy (p. 57).

Since his election in 1996, John Howard and his ministers have been claiming that
the Liberal Party is more of a friend of Medicare than the Labor Party. Former
Health Minister Michael Wooldridge (Medicare Stronger than Ever, 2000), Health
Minister Tony Abbott (Abbott, Gillard battle, 2004), and the Prime Minister have
at every opportunity have expressed the claim that the Liberal-Coalition party are
'better friends of Medicare than the Labor Party' (Medicare Announcement, 2004).
In a tight contest between two parties selling the same product, 'repetition and
visibility are the only true measures of success' (Klein, 2001, p. 49).
Habermas argues that conducting non-public opinion polling of the electorate
results in 'issue related arguments' and 'political program statements' becoming
symbols and representations (Habermas, 1989, pp. 217-218). Therefore, rather than
fluid and fluctuating opinions on political issues in the form of national debates,
internal polling congeals a non-public opinion to be used strategically by a party.
Therefore, an advertisement (Appendix: B) extolling the virtues of the
government's added benefits to Medicare, such as the 'safety net', served to
associate the green and gold Medicare logo more with the government than the
Opposition. The Medicare commercials were promoted by the government public
service announcements rather than advertisements, though currently it is apparently
a moot point as to what constitutes an advertisement or public service
announcement. While accepting that both parties have spent excessive amounts of
public money on advertising, the ABC's Media Watch (Aren't there any rules?,
2004) claim that Howard's Medicare advertisements are broadcast in spite of
recommendations made in 2000, by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts &
Audit, that recommends a ban on the 'dissemination of material to the public which
promotes activities, programs or initiatives of the government in a politically
partisan or biased manner'. A later government report into the conduct of the 2001
Federal Election shows a regression on the issue of government advertising. The
report reveals that:
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there are significant difficulties both in defining what
constitutes government advertising for political purposes, and
in determining appropriate regulation and enforcement
mechanisms (Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters,
2001, p. xxxvi).

Putting a positive spin on Howard's behaviour would mean accepting that the use
of polls is the process of using science in trying to make democracy rational, with
better governance over the population the intended result. However, this would
ignore the recent coverage of 'Prime Minister John Howard [apologising] for
raising the safety net thresholds by hundreds of dollars', despite Tony Abbott's
"'iron-clad" guarantee, ... made during the election, that the threshold would stay
the same' (Abbott knew of safety net, 2005). In light of this, John Howard could be
accused of using opinion polls and marketing strategies to secure his own
popularity and power.
In another example, The Australian Financial Review's [AFR] David Bassanese
believed that internal government polling had recognised a stark reality faced by
'Australian Households', that 'they're way over their heads in debt and acutely
sensitive to the fear that their interest bill might rise further' (Bassanese, 2004, p.
21 ). The Coalition's recognition of this circumstance in connection with the
government's election strategy would suggest attempts by the government at
playing on the fears and vulnerabilities of a substantial proportion of indebted
families. The following paragraph of rhetorical questions is what constituted John
Howard's' election campaign, and he and his team adhered to it religiously
throughout the campaign:
Who do you trust to keep the economy strong? Who do you
trust to keep interest rates low? Who do you trust to lead the
fight on Australia's behalf against international terrorism?
Who do you trust to keep the budget strong? The election will
be about the future of this nation over the next ten years
(Choice of October 9, 2004).

Howard's own strategy was to campaign heavily on the symbols of national
security and the economy. Translating one Foucault's College de France lecture,
Colin Gordon (cited in Burke, 2003, p. 270) argues that Foucault treats security 'as
a specific principle of political method and practice', and as such, 'we live today
not so much in a Rechsstaat or disciplinary society as in a society of security'.
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Furthermore, security can be linked with any other number of 'governmental
configurations', such as welfare, defence, immigration, science and economics (pp.
270-273). Consequently, Prime Minister Howard announced that the election was a
referendum on which party could be better 'trusted' to deliver 'strength and
stability' in relation to the vast national security and economic challenges that
needed to be faced.
For example, on September 9, 2004 there was a terrorist attack on the Australian
embassy in Jakarta, with those responsible claiming to be members of the
organisation called Jemaah Islamiah [JI]. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer,
during a press conference in Jakarta, claimed that the bombing was directed at the
Australian embassy, but that there was no evidence to support any claims that the
bombing was designed to influence the Indonesian or Australian election results, as
it did in Madrid (Downer, 2004). Both Latham and Howard were quick to condemn
the terror attacks and to pay their respects to those that had died or been injured.
The press and news broadcasters used the situation to devote large portions of
newspaper space or broadcast time to dwell on 'our' casualties. Articulating public
sentiment symbolically or pictorially towards political issues is one of the key
mechanisms that the media and political parties use. Stuart Ewen, a media theorist,
states that symbols have the capacity 'to magnify emotion while undermining
critical thought, to emphasise sensations while subverting ideas' (Ewen, 1996, p.
157). In Walter Lippmann's (cited on p. 157) words, 'in the symbol, emotion is
discharged at a common target and the idiosyncrasy of real ideas is blotted out'. As
Habermas states, the function of mass media is about 'exploiting events that attract
attention' (Habermas, 1989, p. 194).

In doing so, the news media adheres to the psychology and techniques associated
with 'pictorial publicity connected to well-tested human interest topics' (p. 194).
Looking at the front page of The West Australian over a year, for example, shows
that approximately 85% of them depict families, children or animals. In the
aftermath of the Jakarta bombing and the Beslan school siege we were faced with
depictions of injured children, or parents and soldiers carrying injured children.
However, we very rarely see injured Iraqi children, even though 'more than half the
deaths reportedly caused by the occupying forces were women and children'
(Burnham, Garfield, Khudhairi, Lafta & Robert, 2004, p. 1863). Habermas argues
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that calculated representations reorient public opinion 'by the formation of new
authorities or symbols which will have acceptance' (Habermas, 1989, p. 194). In
this case, acquiring public sympathy and acclamation of the war in Iraq, and the
'war on terrorism' in general.
The Sydney Morning Herald's political reporter, Louise Dodson, claimed that
'suddenly the sedate and slickly managed federal election campaign had been
disrupted' (Dodson, 2004). Dodson incorporated the attack into the campaign
narrative by arguing that how 'Mr Howard and Mr Latham respond to the renewed
threat of terrorism will play a large part in determining the outcome of the election'
(Dodson, 2004). The ABC news and current affairs programming presented the
story in a similar manner. On the evening of the Jakarta bombing, as well as the
following evening, the 7.30 Report dedicated the entire show to covering the
terrorist attack. The program's host, Kerry O'Brien, said that in the context of an
election campaign the attack on Australian interests, albeit abroad, was
unprecedented, and that the 'reverberations from the bomb in Jakarta stopped the
campaigning politicians in their tracks this afternoon in Australia' (O'Brien, 2004).
The program included interviews with the Foreign and Shadow Foreign Ministers,
Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and terrorism experts. O'Brien claimed that 'how politicians
respond to this affront and a nation of electors read and react to it, will dramatically
inform the election campaign' (O'Brien, 2004). It was clear at this stage that the
news media were expecting that the bombing would have some bearing on the
campaign, and how the public ultimately voted.
There was speculation in the media over whether or not the bombing in Jakarta was
used to create pressure on the Australian government to withdraw its troops from
Iraq. Such a scenario had already played out in Spain only days before their
national elections, with the incumbent losing government. After the Madrid train
bombing Mick Keelty (Keelty, 2004) declared that 'the reality is, if this turns out to
be Islamic extremists responsible for this bombing in Spain, it's more likely to be
linked to the position that Spain and other allies took on issues such as Iraq'.
Before making such a claim Keelty may have done himself a service by reflecting
on Ernest Renan's (cited in Said, 1995, p. 148) claim that it is 'better to be
mistaken along with the nation than to be right with those who tell it hard truths'.
Downer countered Keelty's comment by claiming that he was 'expressing a view
which reflects a lot of the propaganda we're getting from Al Qaeda' (Aust warns
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Spain, 2004). General Cosgrove was also prompted to comment. While believing
that Keelty and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) were doing a 'fantastic' job,
Cosgrove stated that 'I see the same intelligence as [Keelty has] seen and I disagree
with him on this occasion'. Keelty' s comments prompted a public reprimand from
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer. Keelty had to be publicly censured to show a
unified front against terrorism, and, most importantly, reinforce the perception of
John Howard as a strong leader.
Security and the economy have always been key factors involved in controlling
populations and consolidating their support, even for some of the most unpalatable
government policies. This is mostly because of the complexity involved in
international relations, the disinterest in military budgets and the clandestine nature
of security agencies (Firth, 1999, p. 70). These are some of the reasons why
reporters, such as Greg Sheridan of The Australian, believe 'John Howard owns
the American alliance politically'... the war on terror and... owns national
security' (Sheridan, 2004). It is also no doubt why governments choose this over
other policy areas to run on during a campaign, as it is an easier platform from
which to attain public support. Habermas states that within an expanded mediatised
public sphere public opinion has the potential to become the:
object to be molded [sic] in connection with a staged display of,
and manipulative propagation of, publicity in the service of
persons and institutions, consumer goods, and programs
(Habermas, 1989, p. 236).

Michel Foucault (cited in Burke, 2003, p. 23) claims that to successfully govern a
state is to 'reinforce the state itself', and that 'government is only possible if the
strength of the state is known; it can thus be sustained'. It is important, then, that a
government gives the public at least the perception of strength, power and control
through performances played out in the news media. While not privy to the internal
manoeuvrings of the two major parties, it would not be a stretch to argue,
regardless of party specific goals, that the mechanics of party operations do not
differ drastically. Therefore, from the perspective of a news media saturated
electorate, the perceptions that a public has of its politicians is everything.
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2.4. Insiders and Outsiders
L. F. Crisp, Emeritus Professor of Political Science in the Australian National
University, believes that 'Democratic Cabinet government based on a virtually two
party system does not allow either major contender for power to be a 'purist' or an
'absolutist' in ideological matters' (Crisp, 1983, p. 53). In this election we saw
reports of Latham seeking to win the aged vote and Howard talking about forests.
Robert Cox (in Habermas, 2001, p. 58) argues that:
All politicians move to the center to compete on the basis of
personality and of who is best able to manage the adjustment in
economy and society necessary to sustain competitiveness in the
global market.

Leading up to, and during, the election campaign both leaders appeared to be
advocating less government intervention, and greater public autonomy. However,
the political philosophies and the way that the news media report them are
ideologically oriented. Historically, the Australian Labor Party, says Crisp, centres
its image on a democratic socialist ideology, while Liberal Party ideology consists
of liberal private enterprise capitalism (Crisp, 1983, p. 53). Rhetorically speaking,
Latham has his 'insiders' and 'outsiders', Howard his ·battlers' and 'elites'.
Habermas cautiously distinguishes the 'loosely organised actors who "emerge
from" the public, as it were, from other actors merely "appearing before'' the
public' (Habermas, 1996, p. 3 7 5). Actors emerging from the public, or civil
society, depend largely on sponsored support in the fonn of finance, organisation,
knowledge and social capital.
For example, one businessman, Ian Melrose, attempted to have an influence on the
moral perceptions of the Australian public, and used his own money to finance a
series advertisements (Appendix C) highlighting the plight of the East Timorese
people affected by the Australian government's dealings over contested gas
reserves. Melrose ·paid around $30,000 for a 30-second television commercial'
(Businessman takes on the Govt, 2004). According to Melrose, his motivation

came from 'involvement with health causes in East Timor, and as a result. .. I've
decided that something's got to be done, where East Timor gets a decent health
system' (2004 ). Channel Seven and SBS have recently pulled the advertisements
claiming that the advertisements depicted graphic scenes not suitable for children.
However, Melrose claims that the advertisements where cleared by the appropriate
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authorities deeming them suitable for free to air television (Timor Sea justice,
2005). This example demonstrates how difficult it has become for members of the
public to raise an issue for public debate. Even with the finance available, securing
support from large influential media organisations is not always assured, especially
if it is in contradiction or conflicts with the internal agendas and strategies of
private television networks, despite their continual appropriation of the forums of
public debate.
The actors appearing before the public have organisational power, resources and
endorsement with which to conduct their endeavours from the very start. The
motivation of these actors is derived from the reward of successful continuation of
the organisation itself, and the profit or power to be made that legitimates their
existence. These actors may include representatives of political parties, unions,
professional and pressure groups (Habermas, 1996, p. 375). In the case of political
parties, inter-organisational relations with other autonomous actors are sustained
through an exchange of power, resources and social influence. On the topic of
receiving political party donations, for example, Dr Andrew Leigh, an economist in
the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University, and a
member of the ALP, writes that:
the biggest advantages for the Coalition were in the finance
sector (ANZ, JP Morgan), food and pastoral (lnghams,
Manildra), industrial and manufacturing (Pratt, Amcor) and
resource companies. Sectors that most strongly favoured the
ALP were professional firms (accounting, law), clubs and hotels
(the Australian Hotels Association) and the union movement
(Leigh & Wolfers, 2004).
Roberts and Crossley claim that the style and manner in which modem election
campaigns that are focused on winning votes through promises of public spending
undercut and make Labour movements impotent (Roberts and Crossley, 2004, pp.
7-8). During the election campaign, headlines and opinion columns in The

Australian contained articles focused on the ALP and their supposed attitude to
labour and industrial reforms. One The Weekend Australian Opinion column was
entitled 'LABOR MUST STAND UP FOR THE WORKERS' (Labor must stand, 2004,
p. 18) and another front-page headline made the claim that 'BUSINESS DUMPS ON
LABOR' (Gluyas & Boreham, September 18-19, 2004, p. 1). The first article
supports the government's intended industrial relations reform, an area that is high
on the list of the coalition government's policy priorities. Asked, in an interview
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with radio 3AW's Neil Mitchell, about the government's position on industrial
relations, the Treasurer Peter Costello stated (Costello, 2004): 'Unfair dismissal
number one'. The second article conveys the apparent fears that large Australian
corporations hold toward any changes a Latham government may make to
industrial relations, and an increased role for unions in work place negotiations.
Along similar lines The Australian reported the Commonwealth Bank of
Australia's (CBA) Chief Executive, David Murray, as saying that he would always
be wary of reforms that would 'threaten productivity' that has been fastest where
there has been a 'flexibility of (employment) contracts' (Gluyas & Boreham,
2004). Murray's take on flexibility echoes a speech made by John Howard, in
February 2004, to the Committee for Economic Development of Australia, where
he stated that 'simplifying the award system and [the] framework for agreements at
the workplace level has provided greater flexibility for both employees and
employers', which has led to 'greater labour market flexibility, higher productivity
[and] a fall in unemployment (Howard, 2004). In this case, however, The
Australian fails to mention Murray's past dealings with CBA staff, and instead uses
Murray's influential position to supply an opinion that discredits Latham's
proposed social IR reforms.
Murray's comments came only one year after he oversaw a restructuring of the
Commonwealth Bank that was designed to 'empower, motivate and skill staff
(Commonwealth plans, 2003). The strategy also proposed cutting 3 700 staff,
whose job security was probably already very tenuous, as approximately '80 per
cent of new jobs in Western industrialised nations are not permanent positions.
Full-time jobs have risen by 14 per cent and part-time jobs by 70 per cent'
(Letcher, 2001). Furthermore, Australian Bureau of Statistics figures show that
jobless rates have increased, and close to two million people are seeking
employment in vain, which subsequently has a discouraging effect on others
seeking jobs. This does not take into account other disadvantaged job seekers such
as, for example, those lacking the appropriate skills and training needed to find
gainful employment

(Letcher, 2001 ). In a recent interview with Associate

Professor of Philosophy, Giovanna Borradori, Habermas reasons that our
communicative relationships with others in society are defined by the normative
values to which we grow accustomed. Habermas (cited in Borradori, 2003, p. 35)
claims that 'we in the West do live in peaceful and well-to-do societies, and yet
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they contain a structural violence that, to a certain degree, we have gotten used to'.
He goes on to say that common language and experience witnessed collectively via
the news media cultivates a climate of 'common background convictions, selfevident cultural truths and reciprocal expectations' (p. 35). Based on these
communicative conditions, claims Habermas:
the coordination of action runs through the ordinary
language games, through mutually raised and at least
implicitly recognised validity claims in the public space of
more or less good reasons.
So, our understanding of each other is very much reliant on the institutions that
inform our understanding of the society in which we live. However, it is precisely
because we share a common perspective on our society through these institutions,
like the news media, that these social bonds can be exploited, where 'conflicts arise
from distortion in communication, from misunderstanding and incomprehension,
from insincerity and deception' (p. 35). Quite apart from the common good of a
society, these common social bonds can be used as a cynical tool against an
indoctrinated public. For example, when the powerful claim that the public must
make sacrifices, usually in the form of job or wage cuts, in order to keep a
particular industry afloat. This tactic can only work if most of the public believe
the economic rationalism that is at the heart of such arguments.
On Lateline, Murray stated that 'nobody likes the idea that we'll have less
employment, but the idea that we will be ineffective as a competitor in the
financial services industry is even worse. We have to be competitive, and this is
the best way of doing it'. Patently, employment environments consisting of a high
level of casual and part time jobs that rely on fluctuating market trends of
corporations place employees in a position of greater financial risk and job
uncertainty. John Howard would have people believe that emancipating workers
from the reins of bureaucracy and unionism gives them more freedom, but when
markets dictate the state of human resources the powerful actually have the
potential to rob the vulnerable of their freedom, and hence a 'failure to protect
them from the misuse of economic power' (Popper, 1974, p. 124). A collaborative
research paper into transitional labour markets, conducted by the University of
Melbourne's Centre for Public Policy, finds that:
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union membership, and hence bargaining power, is particularly
low in those occupations and industries most prone to precarious
working conditions, which means that enterprise bargaining
merely exacerbates the fragmentation of employment conditions.
Some form of regulation through legislation or centralised
bargaining may be necessary (Considine, Hancock, Howe &
Ziguras, 2004, p. 10).
As Habermas observes, corporations and political parties left to their 'own internal
logics' can have a destructive effect on society. It was a hollow boast, then, when
Prime Minister Howard proudly . announced to The Committee for Economic
Development of Australia (CEDA) crowd that 'we now have an economy where
fewer than one in five private sector workers belongs to a trade union' (Howard,
2004). We are only left to ponder whether Prime Minister Howard's delight in low
levels of union membership and reduced job security characterises what he terms
'modem conservatism in social policy' (2004). However, as long as the news
media continue to give a voice to the voices of large organisations over civil
society their philosophies on society will remain dominant, and to some degree
accepted as valid.
While there are news media organisations, like the ABC, SBS, The Age and The

Sydney Morning Herald, who often report on corporations' shortcomings, other
organisations, such as The Australian, generally tend to be a little more
conservative in this department. Turner claims that:
As media corporations diversify, and as their level of integration
with the business sector as a whole increases, it is not surprising
that we have seen an increasing degree of discretion in dealing
with financial and commercial stories
In this respect, we can argue that the relationship between the corporate sector and
the corporate news media is an unsurprisingly protective one. When the news
media focus upon the nuances of domestic economic concerns they tend to ignore
the political push for Australia to have a more active role within a global economy.
In doing so the news media resolve the problem of reporting on the human cost of
such economic rationalism. Dee Margets claims that over the past twenty years,
during a period of great economic restructuring and rationalising in Australia,
much of the media focus has been distracted from the bigger picture of Australia's
global economic role. This is inconsistent, claims Margets, in a lecture delivered at
Curtin University, televised by community broadcaster Channel 31, because while
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the mainstream news media report on domestic issues of the General Sales Tax
(GST), petrol prices and the National Competition Policy (NCP), they really should
have more focus, analysis and political accountability on shifts that will have
widespread economic fallout, such as the recent Free Trade Agreement with the
United States. As has already been suggested in previous examples, journalists,
publicity agents and members of the press 'to a certain extent control the entry of
topics, contributions, and authors into the mass-media-dominated public sphere'
(Habermas, 1996, p. 376). If the processes of campaigns and politics are in effect
invisible to the public, yet journalists are going to report anyway, political parties
would rather have some influence over what the media report.
Media control has become a necessary element of a political party's operations.
Ward states that during the 1970s, Malcom Fraser formed the Government
Information Unit (GIU), which was designed purely to control news media and to
become alert to news media developments in general. Despite the Australian
Labour Party's protestations of GIU' s existence, the ALP created their own media
control body called the National Media Liaison Service (NMLS), dubbed aNiMLS
by the Canberra Press Gallery (Ward, 1997, p. 170). At the time Paul Kelly (cited
in p. 170), a former press gallery correspondent, described the aNiMLS as a 'de
facto research unit for the press gallery'. Both GIU and the NMLS can be viewed

as partisan political apparatuses. Tiffen believes that since the 1970s and 1980s,
political campaigning practices have progressively made them an inadequate
'vehicle for accountability and meaningful public choice' (Tiffen, 1989, p. 152).
Sydney Morning Herald journalist and once ABC's Media Watch host, David Marr,

claims that:
Canberra doesn't leak in the way it once did. The cabinet
and the party room are superbly disciplined. Bureaucrats
are nervous. Leaks happen, but these days the government
leaks to favoured journalists who give the public sneak
previews of government policy (Marr, 2004).
This approach has largely been at the expense of speaking plainly and openly to the
public on policy matters. Margets claims that there is little public discussion
promoted by government because central to any debate on these topics would be
the ongoing privatisation of public utilities and the casualisation, or increased
'flexibility', of Australia's workforce. This, together with Firth's observation that
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news media editors do not use foreign policy issues because they are too
complicated for audiences, means that there is little coverage of developments that
significantly affect Australian's lives. The point here is that alternative economic
viewpoints that may counter established political and economic experts do not
often get a hearing in the mainstream press. That is, while there were reports that
followed Mark Vaile's progress on the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US,
and other reports that addressed Labor's initial opposition to the agreement, the
FT A did not become a defining election issue. This, despite the controversy that
continued over the effect that the FT A would have on the Pharmaceuticals Benefits
Scheme (PBS), shows how debate can be buried even during the heightened
political awareness of an election.
For political parties' organisational affiliations, together with mainstream news
media attention can lend support to their campaign, and define election policy. The
philosophies behind news media stories are, to some degree, complex. For example,
judging The Australian by its actions, the CEO and editors perhaps felt that the way
the government handled asylum seekers was ethically questionable during the 2001
election campaign and, therefore, took the government to task in a major front page
story for its cynical management of the children overboard affair. On matters of
finance and the economy, however, the editors and opinion writers of The
Australian seem to hold a different perspective, regardless of ethical concerns, as

was highlighted in the previous section.
As businesses themselves, they have a vested interest in deregulation and the reform
of cross-media ownership laws that will allow for a greater share in domestic and
global media industries (Acker, 2000, pp. 187-195). There is also another factor,
according to The Australian's CEO Michael Stutchbury, that determines the content
to be published or broadcast in the news media. Stutchbury's research into
Australian defamation law was delivered as a speech at the International Media
Ethics Conference in Canberra on July 4, 2002, and appears in transcript form,
entitled 'Rising Culture of Suppression', on Crikey.com. It is worth mentioning that
Crikey.com (About Crikey, 2005) defines itself an online news media website that
is 'independent and ... not part of a media empire', and brings its readers 'the inside
word on what's really going on in politics, government, media'. Stutchbury (2005)
argues that:
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High quality journalism... is in the public interest. Yet, the
substantial and increasing defamation costs imposed upon media
companies act, in effect, as a tax upon quality journalism. In the
political debate over media regulation, much is made of the need
for "diversity" of media outlets. One source of diversity is smallscale and low-cost outlets, sometimes renegade in nature, which
irritate the big companies in various ways. The crap-shoot of the
defamation explosion can threaten to wipe out such outlets such
as Crikey.com. And in much more pervasive ways, the uncertain
threat of defamation litigation has a chilling effect on the media's
ability to vigorously report and analyse public events. In this
way, the public's right to know and its ability to speak out is
infringed, to the detriment of the democratic system.

Selective journalism, due either to the vested interests of news media organisations,
or forced upon them by defamation laws or as a result of the closed nature of
government, demonstrates a failing in the systems and institutions that are
supposed to inform our judgments that ultimately shape the public's perspective on
government and their political institutions.

In this respect, legitimacy of government derived from the processes of private
news media organisations, distinct from a reasoning public sphere, can be called
into question as without consistency in journalism there will likely be scepticism
among the public. Unlike non-public opinion, such as the clandestine opinions of
political parties and corporations that, nonetheless, have public implications, public
opinion must emerge from the public sphere itself after actors with strategic intent
candidly put their case or policy forward to private citizens (Habermas, 1996, p.
364). 'Candidly' is the operative word in this case, as the public must be aware of
the kinds of activities public representatives are conducting in their name. If
opinion is seen to be manipulated then it is most likely that voters will resist or
disengage from the political process. One unionist, who has no particular liking for
either party leader, claimed that while watching our politicians slug it out on
television may be entertaining, 'it leaves the entire institution discredited in the
eyes of the public. Which is classic Tory political tactics - take away faith in
politics and social change will never flourish' (Dirty Deeds, 2002). The following
accounts are examples of how the 'discrediting' can occur.
Despite calling the election date, Howard allowed the Senate to proceed with an
inquiry into the children overboard affair, officially known as 'a certain maritime
incident'. Howard stated in The Age that 'I didn't want anybody to suggest that I
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was trying to prevent the Senate doing any pointless political business it might
want to do' (Campaign to be about trust, 2004). This, however, did not mean that
the government would be a passive observer to the inquiry. Patrick Walters of The
Australian, who carries the title of 'National Security editor', claimed that Senator

Robert Hill (in Walters, 2004) believed Labor was 'trying to drag the Senate into
the gutter rather than debate issues of real interest to the electorate'. Again another
government minister, this time Robert Hill, was trying to discredit any action taken
by the Senate, claiming that any new probe into the Scrafton revelations was an
'unprecedented abuse of the Senate'. Howard and his government continually
played down and dismissed the new children overboard allegations as irrelevant,
claiming the public were bored of the issue. Howard (cited in Tell voters about
future, 2004) stated:
I do believe that the Australian public want to hear from both
parties about the next 10 years, not about the last three days of
the last election campaign.

John Anderson, leader of the National Party and Deputy Prime Minister, also
helped in trying to control any potential public interest in the inquiry, while also
protecting Howard's credibility. On Channel Nine's Today Show, a less hostile
interview arena for the government, Anderson (cited in Today Show, August 18
2004) pointed to a 'ferocious campaign from some quarters, to establish the
premise that we can't be trusted'. Anderson stated 'I trust the Prime Minister, and I
trust him very deeply, and I believe that people who know him trust him and I
believe that the bulk of Australians do as well' (August 18, 2004). The rhetoric
coming from the government attempted to show the Labor Party in a hostile light,
as though they were the ones under Senate scrutiny. Government ministers'
interactions with the press were aimed at trying to placate the electorate and divert
attention away from the Scrafton claims.
As already stated, The Australian's stance was not supportive of the government's
handling of the children overboard affair. As a result, opinions that may not
otherwise have surfaced were made public by the newspaper. On August 16, The
Australian ran comprehensive story entitled: 'REVEALED: THE MISSING LINK IN
THE CHILDREN OVERBOARD AFFAIR. HOW ARD WAS TOLD THE TRUTH'

(Walters, 2004, p. 1). The article, comprised of a number of different sections
throughout the newspaper, provided detailed background and recent updates. The
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'missing link' was of course the former semor advisor to Peter Reith, Mike
Scrafton. Scrafton's presence just prior to the campaign was a central reason that
Howard was running his campaign on 'trust', or what Scrafton describes as the
government sidestepping a 'critical issue' (the children overboard affair),
trivialised and distorted by the slogan 'truth in government' (Scrafton, 2004). In a
letter published in The Australian, on the 16 August, 2004, Scrafton wrote:
The report of the Senate committee inquiring into a Certain
Maritime Incident - the children overboard affair - found the
inquiry had been "significantly hampered" by my refusal to
testify before it. The salient issue for the committee was "the
extent of the Prime Minister's knowledge of the false nature of
the report that children were thrown overboard" and therefore
"the extent to which the Government as a whole wilfully misled
the Australian people on the eve of an election" (Scrafton, 2004,
p. 8).

In this new chapter of the children overboard affair, Scrafton rhetorically asks:
'What would I have told the Senate Committee?' Scrafton claims that after viewing
video tapes, taken from the HMAS Adelaide, on November 7 2004, that were
supposed to show children being thrown overboard by asylum seekers he spoke to
John Howard three times by mobile phone. Scrafton writes that:
In the course of those calls I recounted to him [Howard] that: a)
the tape was at best inconclusive as to whether there were any
children in the water but certainly didn't support the proposition
that the event occurred; b) that the photographs that had been
released in early October were definitely of the sinking of the
refugee boat on October 8 and not of any children being thrown
into the water; and c) that no one in Defence that I dealt with on
the matter still believed any children were thrown overboard.
During the last conversation, the Prime Minister asked me how
it was that he had a report from the Office of National
Assessments confirming the children overboard incident. I
replied that I had gained the impression that the report had as its
source the public statements of the then minister for
immigration, Philip Ruddock (p. 8).

When the Prime Minister asked how this could be the case, Scrafton advised that
he should ask the director general of the ONA, Kim Jones (p. 8). The objective that
ALP Senators had, then, was to determine what the Prime Minister knew at the
time and if the Prime Minister had in fact spoken to Jones.
Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Senator Conroy, asked Senator Hill 'Did the
Prime Minister take Mr Scrafton's advice before he released it to the media at the
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National Press Club on 8 November 2001 ?' (Senate Hansard, 2004, p. 26626).
Senator Robert Hill continued with the Coalition's campaign strategy, stating:
I suspect that this reflects the Labor Party campaign for this
election. This is the alternative that they are putting to the
Australian people. no policies, no alternative vision for Australia.
Where is their tax policy? What about interest rates? We
remember that when Labor was last in government housing
interest rates were 17 per cent (p. 26626).

Despite the renewed news media coverage of the children overboard affair, there
was no way of knowing how the electorate were responding to the issue of truth in
government. Hugh MacKay's suspicions of a 'disengaged', 'leave it to the leader'
(McKay & Brown, 2004) mentality prevailing within certain sections of the
electorate was beginning to sound prophetic. Grahame Morris, a 'former' advisor
to Prime Minister Howard, predicted that it would be unlikely that the ALP would
continue with the children overboard Senate inquiry. Morris (2004) claimed on

Lateline that:
I would actually doubt that because they may well find that this
piddly little thing is running through the entire election campaign
and it is overshadowing their education policy, their health story,
their tax policy, their family policy.

The news media did indeed appear to mirror the government's belief that the public
were bored with the Scrafton enquiry, as the Scrafton saga was now competing
with terrorist acts playing out in Russia, and the bombing of the Australian
embassy in Jakarta.
Participants on the Special Broadcasting Service's (SBS) own focus group forum
conducted on the program Insight, an episode entitled Who Do You Trust?, voiced
concerns at the level of trust the public had to oblige the government. One woman
(cited in Who Do You Trust?, 2004) made a claim that in her own experience:
we have to take our politicians on face value because, frankly, we
may not have the resources, we may not have the education to
gather source documents, to look at source documents and come to
an intelligent decision.

During the forum there were a number of comments that reflected this opinion.
Some members of the Insight audience felt that they were not being adequately
informed vital information about how Australia is governed. They demonstrated a
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certain amount of contempt toward newspapers, with one man (cited in Who Do
You Trust?, 2004) stating that 'I know that whenever I pick up this newspaper
[holds up a copy of The Australian], they're for John Howard and George Bush.
Everything they say is manipulated'.
Feedback from people participating in another focus group study conducted by
Michael Pusey among middle Australia indicate that it is difficult to:
orient [their] actions to others, and how to find, and to read,
reliable feedback in a depleted civil society in which informal
communication channels seem scrambled with noise and
contradiction (Pusey, 2003, p. 136).

A study by David Denemark into televised election campaigning in Australia used
the Converse model of media effects. Denemark maintains that central to
'Converse's model of media effects on electoral behaviour is the importance of
individuals' existing political interest, loyalties and awareness in mediating those
effects' (Denemark, 2002, p. 663). The above examples perhaps show individuals
who question, analyse and find bias in the information that they receive via the
press or television, yet find it frustrating that there are no clear representations of
political authority and power. In addition, Iyengar, Peters and Kinder (cited in p.
664) discovered that televised political communication had a substantial effect on
news media viewers who were 'less able or willing to counter-argue with a news
presentation', while their politically informed opposites appeared better able to
'resist agenda-setting through effective counter-arguing'. What Denemark claims
these findings show is that those with the least amount of interest in politics are the
same people who will more likely be influenced by television news media coverage
of an election campaign. These relationships become complex when the 'two-step'
flow of communication theory is taken into account. Two-step flow of
communication theory, attributed to Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, examines the
'informal social relationships' between 'opinion leaders', those who are to a greater
or lesser degree engaged with messages via mass media, and those whose exposure
to media content is limited or nonexistent (De Fleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1982, p.
193). Importantly, opinion leaders are often, though not always, from a similar
social structure, which is a 'key variable in determining who would influence [and]
shape the voting intentions of those to whom they were passing on information' (p.
193).
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A society is comprised of many views and opinions, which is why authority and
expert opinion alone can never democratically represent legitimate public opinion.
Non-public opinions that act as the self appointed voice of the people are either
misguided in their assumptions or deliberately manipulative. C. W. Mills claims
that journalists and political analysts tend to overemphasise middle levels of power.
While neglecting the top and bottom of the social structure, political journalists risk
obscuring the structures of power in their entirety (Mills, 2000, p. 244):
As a professor or as a free-lance intellectual, the political analyst is
generally on the middle levels of power himself. He knows the top
only by gossip; the bottom, if at all, only by 'research'. But he is at
home with the leaders of the middle level, and, as a thinker himself,
with their bargaining (p. 245)
Middle level political commentators and journalists are still, like Martin Luther
before them, 'locked in a battle for men's minds' (Anderson, 2003, p. 40). As
opinion leaders in their own right, they can use their influence to convey certain
opinions to an audience of listeners whose own unspoken opinions they can
articulate. The success of commentators like Alan Jones and John Laws can be
attributed to their persuasive and shrewd use of the vernacular. As Benedict
Anderson observes, 'Protestantism was always fundamentally on the offensive,
precisely because it knew how to make use of the expanding vernacular printmarket being created by capitalism' (p. 40). One need only exchange the word
Protestantism for its counterpart, the ideology of 'consumerism', and we have a
neat description of the commercial media industry today. That is, the pervasiveness
and popularity of commentators such as Jones and Laws is a predictable symptom
of an amalgamation between capitalism, the news media and politics. It highlights
a system that values profit as its own end, where the integration of corporate news
media and political power sustain the conditions under which the channels of
public discourse are severely compromised (Acker, 2000, pp. 185-187). Perhaps
this is why political and social commentators like Paul Kelly, Janet Albrechtsen
and Philip Adams can appear together in The Australian without apparent
contradiction, despite often extreme political and social differences.
It would indeed be difficult to understand these relationships based on small
groupings of individuals within a social stratum in the context of an election. Given
that the key determinant of two-step flow is the influence of opinion leaders is
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horizontal, it could be argued that any one social group may share the same set of
social and economic concerns and may, therefore, reflect a mutual understanding.
Habermas argues that Katz and Lazarsfeld's 'opinion leaders' work on a much
greater vertical, hierarchical level, with the wealthier and more educated having a
certain amount of influence over those in the lower status groups who hold no
particular party loyalty. However, interaction that occurs in this way should not be
mistaken for public opinion and will-formation within the public sphere. Why
public opinion formation under these circumstances cannot be considered as
legitimately emerging from the public sphere is because these roles become fixed,
creating a two-tier system of influence that precludes rational-critical debate
(Habermas, 1989, p. 213). That is, opinions held by opinion leaders have a
tendency to go unchallenged and their legitimacy assumed without argument.
Given the opportunity to respond, however, sometimes reveals a more complex
truth.
During SBS's Insight program, for example, journalist Margo Kingston and John
Roskam, a political scientist and former coalition advisor, assumed the existence of
two types of voter. The first is a small group of 'elites' who have the time and
money to concern themselves with issues of honesty and trust in government, such
as the children overboard affair and the invasion of Iraq at the hands of the alleged
'coalition of the willing'. The second group are the working class, Howard's
'battlers', who are only concerned with interest rates and economic security. One
woman (cited in Who Do You Trust?, 2004) from the focus group resented the idea
that someone could consider that there was only a small elite group of people to
whom the issue of truthfulness is important. Continuing, she said:
I'm not a member of a small, elite group, I'm a member of a large
working class. The principle of truth, of an elected representative is
such a fundamental core issue I find it hard to believe that there are
other people out there who can say, "I have my doubts about this
person's fundamental integrity," yet "I'm going to set their basic lack of
regard for the truth aside and I'm going to accept their reporting at face
value," I just find that inconceivable.

This demonstrates that it is only through rational discourse that generalisations,
symbolism and ideology can be avoided and a move toward understanding is
achieved through communicative bonds. Proper dialogue and discourse are
essential ingredients that are missing from the news media channels that deal in
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political comment, and as a result such comments are often met with hostility and
resentment. Kingston's distinction between the two voter bases may have validity,
and she no doubt used the distinction as a convenient way to argue a point.
However, faced with a member of the public whom Kingston identified as working
class and therefore without a capacity for moral reflection highlights the
complexity of communicative relations. Furthermore, it demonstrates how
impoverished polls, demography and the overall scientific reduction of society can
be, and the assumptions, manipulation and miscommunication they can cause when
used deliberately, irresponsibly or without thinking.
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Conclusion
The function that the new mass communications had in the previous centuries was
to maintain mercantilist connections among the bourgeois. What followed was a
period in which actors in government became open to public scrutiny that was
cultivated by the connection of private persons coming together as a public via
mediated accounts by persons close to power themselves. However, news and
information has in itself become a commodity, and the news media, as private
organisations, seek legitimacy by way of public acclamation and loyalty in order to
remain competitive enough to exist alongside their rivals. Additionally, in response
to the pervasiveness of the mass media, political parties, and their affiliates, use the
news media in much the same way as corporations do in selling manufactured
products and services to the public. Subsequently, the intended function of the
news media, to inform the opinions of private persons who then test these opinions
together as a public via rational-critical debate, continues to be eclipsed by
powerful and influential actors external to any common sphere of lived experience
and communicative bonds that this generates. That is, opinions held by powerful
organisations outside the common concerns of everyday life experienced by private
persons are reached without the acknowledgement of the public to be addressed,
but whose acclamation is sought publicly. As a theory that claims that our news
media systems cannot adequately execute their function as an institution that holds
government accountable, Habermas's theory of an eroded public sphere is
predictably a controversial one. The news media and the mass media in general
now serve many functions within a diverse Australian culture. They entertain,
educate, and keep us informed about the society in which we live, and this is as it
should be. However, the emphasis that the news media place on entertainment
value is a direct result of the competitive nature of market economy news media,
where the highest profile, highest rating and most entertaining stories have priority.
The techniques used in an attempt to attract public support for private organisations
often rely on the acquisition of the nascent, untested private opinions of isolated
persons. That is, private opinions can be manipulated by surveys and polls because
the way in which a question is posed and structured can inform the answer. While
poll results can have a positive role to play in providing an idea of public sentiment
on an issue they should be used with care, as the great concern is that results may
be used to determine government policy, or to legitimate a policy without public
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debate. The other concern is the way in which they are used by the news media in
the creation of stories that are reported as if factual, and as a result news becomes
prophecy, rather than journalism. This kind of integration is again an example that
further distorts information intended to inform a public with disinterested
information, which results in a lack of public faith in news media or political
institutions.
Despite the growing forms of new media available online, the majority of people
source their news media from traditional forms like television and newspapers.
Much of the public do not have the time, education, money or resources available
to research what their politicians tell them. As such, news organisations should feel
that they have a great responsibility toward the information they provide to the
public about our politicians and government. On reading Habermas, one can only
conclude that without an informed public there are fewer opinions and active
members of the public emerging from within the public sphere that have the ability
to express opinions on our media or political institutions. News and current affairs
programs such as the ABC's Lateline and 7.30 Report, SBS's Insight do offer the
public a chance to hear different perspectives being argued on a given political or
social issue. The interactions between experts, focus groups and politicians on
Insight seems a very informative and engaging way of addressing concerns
common to public experience. This kind of debate is also useful in exposing
assumptions and crossing communicative barriers raised by the distortion and the
categorisation of commercialised integrated media that makes the public sphere
ineffective. That is, while there is not always agreement on certain issues between
the participating parties, a communicative bond is created during the process of
rational debate.
By the same token, however, SBS, along with Channel Seven, has demonstrated
that they can discriminate between the public voices that they allow broadcast time
to for the purposes of advertisements and public messages. While they happily
advertise cars, finance and computers, all aimed at the higher end of the market,
they will not broadcast an advertisement depicting the plight of needy East
Timorese people. To remain balanced, however, we should also note that the
journalists and editors of news programs may be constrained by other factors, such
as defamation laws, that subvert a free and open flow of information. The task of
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holding power to account is not an easy one, but, as White and Pilger argue, such
pressures should be ignored in the pursuit of an open society.
However, one of Scrafton's major coups was being able to have letters published in
The Australian in regard to the 'children overboard' affair. In a chapter devoted to

the relationship between the public service and the press, Henry Mayer (Mayer,
1994, pp. 132-140) offers the suggestion, that perhaps in the future, public servants
will have a greater public role in informing and keeping up to date with the press
on political matters. While it is arguable what influence, if any, the Scrafton
inquiry had on the election campaign, none would argue that the case did not
generate interest among the news media, albeit briefly. However, the Scrafton
letters may do more to show the selectiveness of the letters page - after all what
editor could resist publishing them. Letters pages in newspapers, while making
public opinion visible, do not as effectively contribute to public debate as well as
real-time interaction. In the pursuit of fairness, equal weight is given to all letters
and there is usually fifty-fifty split between politically left and right leaning
contributors. This seems to be the only real way of being fair, but a number of
things should be taken into account, such as strength of argument and why editors
from one week to the next choose letter topics. It is interesting to note that in the
recent wake of government rollbacks, such as the Medicare safety net, The
Australian letters page (Rotten to the core, 2005, p. 18) was filled to capacity with

vehement anti-government contributions. It is as though The Australian had offered
a cathartic outlet for disgruntled voters. As such, it can perhaps be viewed as an
attempt at placating a section of their reading audience and a reinforcing loyalty to
the newspaper. This altruism will no doubt eventually fade, as will the cavalier
behaviour of the government, the closer we move toward the next election.
While research relating to audience reception and behaviour toward news media is
amorphous, it would be a mistake to simply label media effects on the public
sphere too difficult to interpret. Generally speaking, there seems to be a correlation
between the format,

quality,

speed, volume

and frequency,

of public

communications and the effectiveness of political strategies. This is at least true in
the minds of political strategists and politicians. Political campaigns have been
reduced to slogans, fear mongering, discrediting of opponents and the choice of
stagnant policy repetition and resistance to debate, rather than engaging in
discourse that involves new ideas, alternative perspectives and real-time public
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op1mons on policy. While we cannot say with any certainty how an audience
receives and interprets news media, we can say that since it is the source of many
people's political information politicians, like corporations, believe that it does
have some effect. Therefore, because they believe that it has an effect,
corporations, political parties and government feel they need to manage their own
appearance in order to gain acclamation of the audience by casting themselves in a
positive light. This interpretation of Habermas is central to this thesis. That is, it is
not, as some critics would argue, Habermas' s intention to label the audience as
incapable of resisting the outside influences of powerful actors. It is the processes
involved in seeking public acclamation and the quality of information emanating
from these processes that produces news media that is inconsistent. It is this
constant barrage of information lacking in consistency or veracity entering the
public sphere that contributes to a public's lack of confidence in their own opinions
and a disengagement with politics altogether. As a result, this chain of events
ostensibly arrests and impoverishes public debate on government dealings, and
obscures important debates that potentially define a nation's moral integrity in a
global setting.
We may conclude by noting that these interactions and integrations are happening
as a predictable result of an amalgamation between capitalism, the news media and
politics. After all, if we invest our faith in a system that values profit as an end in
itself, where the corporate news media and politicians advocate and actively
encourage distinctions between winners and losers, the conditions under which the
channels of communication operate will continue to be severely compromised.
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APPENDICES
Appendix: A
The McQuillan Report: A different way of covering daily television news

[Full transcript can be found at:
http://www.abc.net.au/sydney/stories/s 1229586.htm]
I. There is little consistency in each network's ability to provide 'exclusive'
Australian stories to lead the network bulletin, or to have an exclusive
story good enough to place in the top four stories.
2. Each network covers the main story of the day in strikingly similar
ways, often using the same talent and similar vision;
3. There is little variance in the coverage of a network story in terms of
story ideas, angles, vision or grabs;
4. The vision and talent are usually set up for the reporters/crews and
producers by way of media conferences and/or doorstops. While this
reflects
and
accommodates
the
pressures
that
each
reporter/crew/producer face in getting a story to air, it also ensure that
the main points which talent want to get across do actually get across.
There is little or no independent analysis of, for example, new political
policy analysis and thus the media conference is the focus of the story:
5. There is questionable value in the current system of each network
sending a reporter and crew to the same event for what will inevitably
be the same story;
6. That the element of competition is by and large failing to produce
significantly different news programmes
The networks need to consider:
•

Why many bulletins are similar to the opposition bulletins, in both
perceptions of story importance (selection), angles and content;

•

That in the cities where the networks are locked in fierce competition,
the populations are significantly high enough to provide stories that
reflect the breadth and depth of people and events that make up the
approximately eight million people;

•

That by pooling resources on what the network news executives
consider to the main common stories of the day, each network would
have more resources to provide a greater variety and depth to the news
stories for their audiences;

•

That by pooling resources to help create for what are considered the
main common stories of the day, the networks would be able to explore
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exclusive stories to cater for the demands of different demographics,
including the demographic that researchers say are declining TV news
viewers, i.e. the 16-25 year olds.
Summary of Findings:
1. An analysis of the breakdown of the main stories covered in this limited
snapshot of nightly news coverage in Sydney and Melbourne reveals:
2. There are few differences in the networks' perceptions of the important
stories of the day;
3. Most networks run the same or similar stories in their bulletins, often
using the same/similar grabs from the same/similar talent, sourced from
the same media conference or doorstop;
4. Each network runs only one, perhaps two stories, that are not run on
another network but this is not a consistent pattern;
5. It should be noted that while this survey compared the local content of
Channels 2, 7, 9 and 10, a point of difference between the commercial
networks and the ABC was the ABC's more comprehensive international
coverage.
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Appendix: B

Audio transcript: 'Strengthening Medicare' advertisement. (Strengthening
Medicare, 2004).
***START***
Q: What's this about the new Medicare safety net?
A: It's one of the ways we're strengthening Medicare.

While Medicare has always covered you in public hospital, the new Safety Net
protects you against high medical costs when you haven't been admitted to hospital.
Q: Like what I pay to my GP?
A: Yes, the costs for a whole range of treatments - like specialists, x-rays, tests, scans ...
Q: But we already get a Medicare rebate on those.

A: And that will continue
But often you need to pay a gap, and that's where this helps.
Q: So how does it work?
A: Now, once your extra costs reach a certain level, Medicare will pay eighty per cent of
that gap for the rest of the year.
Q: Sound good - but when does it kick in?
A: For most families with children and concession card holders, the level is $300 a year.
For everyone else - $700.
Q: Is that $300 each
A: No, for couples it's for both of you. And for families it includes all of you.
Q: That should be a help.

A: The New Safety Net. It's just one of the ways we're strengthening Medicare.
A: To find out more, watch out for this booklet.

***END**
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Appendix C: Timor Sea Justice Campaign
Friday 25th of March, 2005 - For immediate release.
SBS AND SEVEN PULL TIMOR SEA ADS
Channel 7 and SBS have announced that they will not be screening the latest television
commercials about the Timor Sea dispute written and funded by Australian businessperson
Ian Melrose.
The two advertisements were to be screened over the Easter Break to mark the anniversary of
the Australian Government's withdrawal of recognition of the maritime boundary jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice.
The ads accuse the Australian Government of stealing $2 billion from East Timor and claim
that "stealing from a third world country kills their children".
The networks have not yet supplied written statements outlining the reasons why they will not
screen the ads, but have indicated that there were concerned about the content of the ads for
young viewers. But Ian Melrose dismisses that argument claiming, "The ads have already
been approved by the appropriate bodies and were deemed suitable for free to air television,
so that can't be the reason."
"What I want to know is, have the networks received any directives or suggestions from the
Australian Government? What's changed since the last ads were screened?" asked Mr
Melrose, who was motivated to run the advertising campaign after reading about the death of
a 12 year old East Timorese girl from worm infestation. A 20 cent tablet could have helped
prevent her death.
Tom Clarke from the Timor Sea Justice Campaign Melbourne, claims it can not be the figures
that the networks object to as the $2 billion is a conservative figure based on publicly
accessible financial reports published by Woodside Petroleum.
''The figures are accurate and stealing simply means taking something that is not yours, so I
don't see what grounds the networks would have for not screening these ads." said Mr Clarke.
The $2 billion worth of royalties the Australian Government has taken, come from the
Laminaria Corallina fields alone. These fields are outside of the Joint Petroleum Development
Area, but are likely to belong to East Timor if maritime boundaries are set in accordance with
current principles oflnternational Law.
The Timor Sea Justice Campaign also backs Mr Melrose's emotive claim that 'stealing from a
third world nation kills children'. Tom Clarke claims, "There is a direct link between the high
number of preventable deaths in East Timor and the drastic lack of funds to establish a
working health system, run de-worming programs, the provision of clean water and so on.
The Australian Government is taking billions of dollars from the poorest nation in Asia, of
course that's having a direct and sometimes fatal impact on East Timorese children."
Officials from SBS and Channel 7 were unavailable for comment today due to the Easter
public holiday.

Mr Melrose will continue his advertising campaign to raise awareness of the Timor Sea
dispute, saying his next focus will be the Australian Government's betrayal of the ANZAC
spirit.
The advertisements can be viewed online at: http://www.timorseajustice.org/tvcs.htmFor further
information please contact: Tom Clarke, Co-ordinator, Timor Sea Justice Campaign, Melbourne. 0422
545 763 tom@timorseajustice.org
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